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Abstract Contemporary theories of entrepreneur-
ship generally focus on the recognition of opportunities
and the decision to exploit them. Although the
entrepreneurship literature treats opportunities as
exogenous, the prevailing theory of economic growth
suggests they are endogenous. This paper advances the
microeconomic foundations of endogenous growth
theory by developing a knowledge spillover theory of
entrepreneurship. Knowledge created endogenously
results in knowledge spillovers, which allow entrepre-
neurs to identify and exploit opportunities.
Keywords Opportunity  Knowledge 
Entrepreneurship  Endogenous growth  Start-ups 
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Any course of action must expose the chooser to
numberless different sequels, rival hypotheses,
some desired and some counter-desired…The
entrepreneur is a maker of history, but his guide
in making it is his judgment of possibilities and
not a calculation of certainties.
G.L.S. Shackle (1982, vii)
1 Introduction
Where do entrepreneurial opportunities come from?
Endogenous growth models suggest R&D activities
are ‘‘purposeful investment in new knowledge’’
undertaken by profit-maximizing firms, where knowl-
edge is an input in the process of generating
endogenous growth (Romer 1990; Segerstrom et al.
1990; Aghion and Howitt 1992).1 The set of techno-
logical opportunity is endogenously created by
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1 Griliches (1979) formalized the knowledge production
function. In this model, firms are also exogenous and pursue
new economic knowledge as an input into future innovative
activity.
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investments in new knowledge. Technological change
is central in explaining economic growth: The rate of
per capita GDP growth equals the rate of technolog-
ical change on the steady state growth path. This
explanation assumes that efficiency of knowledge
production is enhanced by the historically developed
stock of scientific-technological knowledge.2
In addition to facilitating technological change,
knowledge also generates opportunities for third-party
firms (Jaffe et al. 1993; Thompson and Fox-Kean
2005), which are often entrepreneurial start-ups
(Shane 2001). This occurs through intra-temporal
knowledge spillovers. Therefore, entrepreneurial
activity involves both arbitrage of opportunities
(Kirzner 1973) and exploitation of new opportunities
created, but not appropriated by incumbent firms
(Schumpeter 1934).
Endogenous growth models are based on strong
assumptions for the technical ease and analysis.
However, these advantages impose drawbacks of
deviations from real-world behavior.
The endogenous growth framework offers no
insight into what role, if any, entrepreneurial activity
plays in the intra-temporal spillover of tacit knowl-
edge. While the new growth theory enhances our
understanding of the growth process, the essence of
the Schumpeterian (1934) entrepreneur is missed. As
a result, endogenous growth models fail to incorpo-
rate a crucial element in the process of economic
growth: Transmission of knowledge spillovers
through entrepreneurship (Audretsch 1995). This
implies that knowledge by itself is only a necessary
condition for the exercise of successful enterprise in a
growth model. An interesting approach recently
focuses on the allocation of societal resources spent
on R&D and entrepreneurship. Michelacci (2003)
concludes that low rates of return to R&D may be due
to lack of entrepreneurial skills. Hence, the ability to
transform new knowledge into economic opportuni-
ties involves a set of skills, aptitudes, insights and
circumstances that is neither uniformly nor widely
distributed in the population.
This paper develops a knowledge spillover
theory of entrepreneurship to improve the
microeconomic foundations of endogenous growth
models, in which the creation of knowledge
expands technological opportunity. The theory shifts
the unit of analysis from exogenously assumed
firms to individual agents with new knowledge
endowments. Agents with new economic knowledge
endogenously pursue the exploitation of such
knowledge, implying that the existing stock of
knowledge yields spillovers. This further suggests a
strong relationship between such knowledge spill-
overs and entrepreneurial activity. The theory
provides an explanation for the role of the individ-
ual and the firm in an economy. According to
Romer (1996, 204), such an approach ‘‘…removes
the dead end in neoclassical theory and links
microeconomic observations on routines, machine
designs, and the like with macroeconomic discus-
sions of technology.’’
The model is one where new product innovations
can come both from either incumbent firms or start-
ups (Acs and Audretsch 1988).3 We can think of
incumbent firms as reliant on incremental innovation
from the flow of knowledge, such as product
improvements. Start-ups with access to entrepreneur-
ial talent and intra-temporal spillovers from the stock
of knowledge are more likely to engage in radical
innovation leading to new industries or replacing
existing products.4 According to Baumol (2004, 9):
‘‘…the revolutionary breakthroughs continue to come
predominantly from small entrepreneurial enter-
prises, with large industry providing streams of
incremental improvements that also add up to major
contributions.’’ Entry by start-ups has played a major
role in radical innovations, such as software, semi-
conductors, biotechnology (Zucker et al. 1998) and
the information and communications technologies
(Jorgenson 2001). Start-ups are especially important
at early stages of the life cycle, when technology is
still fluid. Therefore, this paper makes the strong
assumption that radical innovation comes from new
firm start-ups.
2 This is not a fixed stock of knowledge. For example, change
introduced by an entrepreneur can make part of the existing
stock of knowledge obsolete.
3 Acs and Audretsch (1988) find that, ceteris paribus, the
greater extent to which an industry comprises large firms, the
greater will be innovative activity, but increased innovative
activity will tend to come from small firms rather than large
firms.
4 A large amount of literature exists that shows how
entrepreneurial start-ups use networks to access the stock of
knowledge.
16 Z. J. Acs et al.
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The main predictions of the model are:
1. An increase in the stock of knowledge has a
positive effect on the level of entrepreneurship.
2. The more efficiently incumbents exploit knowl-
edge flows, the smaller the effect of new
knowledge on entrepreneurship.
3. Entrepreneurial activities decrease under greater
regulation, administrative burden and market
intervention by government.
Thus, entrepreneurship contributes to economic
growth by acting as a conduit5 through which
knowledge created by incumbent firms spills over
to agents who endogenously create new firms.
Opportunities are created when incumbent firms
invest in, but do not commercialize, new knowledge.
In this theory, entrepreneurship is a response to these
opportunities. We suggest that, ceteris paribus,
entrepreneurial activity will be greater where invest-
ments in new knowledge are relatively high, since
start-ups will exploit spillovers from the source of
knowledge production (the incumbents). In an envi-
ronment with relatively low investments in new
knowledge, there will be fewer entrepreneurial
opportunities based on potential spillovers.
Our theoretical model explains entrepreneurship as
a function of the following factors: knowledge stock,
R&D exploitation by incumbents and barriers to
entrepreneurship. It considers factors such as risk
aversion, legal restrictions, bureaucratic constraints,
labor market rigidities, taxes, lack of social accep-
tance, etc. This explains why economic agents might
decide against starting up, even when in possession of
knowledge that promises potential profit opportunity.
In addition, culture, traditions and institutions are
more difficult factors to identify than strictly eco-
nomic factors, but they also play an important role in
entrepreneurship. To capture such country-specific
differences, we estimate a reduced form equation
with a fixed-effect panel-regression technique.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section
examines knowledge spillovers as a source of entre-
preneurial opportunity in the endogenous growth
framework. We present a formal model in Sect. 2.
We test and discuss results in Sects. 3 and 4, using data
for the period 1981–2002 for 19 OECD countries. Our
results show that entrepreneurial activity is strongly
influenced by knowledge created but not exploited by
incumbent firms. We conclude in the final section.
2 Knowledge spillovers as source
of entrepreneurial opportunity
In order to enable more realistic applicability, the
theory relaxes two central assumptions of the endog-
enous growth model. The first is that all knowledge is
economic knowledge. Arrow (1962) emphasized
knowledge as inherently different from traditional
factors of production, resulting in a gap between new
knowledge (K) and what he termed economic knowl-
edge (Kc).6 The second assumption is the assumed
spillover of knowledge. In endogenous growth mod-
els, the existence of the factor of knowledge is equated
with inter-temporal spillover, which yields endoge-
nous growth. In our model we assume intra-temporal
knowledge spillovers from incumbent organizations to
start-ups. Moreover, institutions impose a gap
between knowledge and economic knowledge
(0 \ Kc/K \ 1), yielding a lower volume of intra-
temporal knowledge spillovers (Acs et al. 2004).
Romer (1990) separates economically useful sci-
entific-technological knowledge into two parts: The
total set of knowledge consists of non-rival, partially
excludable knowledge elements, and the rival,
excludable elements of knowledge. Codified knowl-
edge published in books, scientific papers or patent
documentations belongs to the first set. This can be
only partially excludable: The right of applying a
technology for production of a particular good is
guaranteed by patenting, but the same technology can
be used in other applications as others learn from the
patent documentation. Rival, excludable knowledge
elements comprise personalized (tacit) knowledge of
5 It is not, of course, the sole conduit.
6 New knowledge leads to opportunities that can be exploited
commercially. However, harnessing new ideas for economic
growth requires converting new knowledge (K) into ‘‘eco-
nomic knowledge’’ that holds commercial opportunity. For
example, only about half of the invention disclosures in US
universities lead to patent applications. Of these applications,
about half result in patents issued, of which only 1/3 are
actually licensed. Between 10–20% of licenses actually yield
significant income (Carlsson and Fridh 2002, 231). In other
words, only 1 or 2% of the inventions are successful in
reaching the market and yielding income.
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individuals and groups, including experiences and
insights of researchers and business people. This does
not go far enough. In the model proposed by Romer
(1990), the movement of knowledge from firms
producing it to other firms is exogenous. That model
explains the effect of knowledge spillovers on
technological change without elaborating why or
how these spillovers occur.7
Why should entrepreneurship play an important
role in the intra-temporal spillover of knowledge?
New knowledge is characterized by greater uncer-
tainty and asymmetry than other economic goods.
Therefore, both the mean expected value of any new
idea and its variance will differ across economic
agents. If an incumbent firm decides the expected
economic value of a new idea is not sufficiently high
to warrant its development and commercialization,
other economic agents may (or may not) assign a
higher expected value to the idea. These agents can
operate within or outside of the incumbent firm. This
divergence in expected valuation can lead to market
entry by economic agents to appropriate new knowl-
edge. The knowledge that induces the decision to
start new firms is generated by investments made by
an incumbent firm. Thus, the start-up serves as the
mechanism through which knowledge spills over
from sources that produced it (such as a university
or research laboratory in an incumbent firm) to a
new organizational form where it is actually
commercialized.
One way to reconcile the difference in the role of
opportunities in models of entrepreneurship and
endogenous growth models is the unit of analysis.
Most models of entrepreneurship focus on the
individual as the decision-making unit of analysis,
whereas the literature on endogenous growth focuses
on the firm as the decision-making unit of analysis. In
such theories, the firm is exogenous, but its role in
generating technological change is endogenous.
Therefore, our theory focuses not on exogenously
assumed firms, but rather, on the individual agent
endowed with new economic knowledge. With this
new focus, the issue of appropriability remains, but
the central question is: How can economic agents
with a given endowment of new knowledge best
appropriate its returns (Audretsch 1995)?
In the knowledge spillover theory of entrepreneur-
ship, the knowledge production function is reversed.
The agent decides to start a new firm based on
expected net return from a new product. Accordingly,
the inventor would expect compensation for the
future value of the potential innovation. In both cases,
the employee in the incumbent firm will weigh the
alternative of starting a new firm. If expected return
from commercialization is sufficiently different for
the inventor and for the incumbent decision-maker,
and if the cost of starting a new firm is sufficiently
low, the employee may choose to leave the incum-
bent firm to start a new firm. These start-ups typically
do not have direct access to a large R&D laboratory.
Rather, they rely on knowledge and experience
gained in R&D laboratories of previous employers,
i.e., the incumbents.
This type of labor mobility is likely to be an
important source of intra-temporal knowledge spill-
overs (Pakes and Nitzan 1983). Essentially, R&D
capital is knowledge that can earn a monopoly rent,
and this potential rent motivates investment in R&D.
To a large extent, R&D capital is embodied in R&D
employees (LR).
8
Hellmann (2007), Lazear (2005), Hvide (2006)
and Anton and Yao (1994) proposed models to
examine conditions under which agents pursue
entrepreneurial activity by starting rival enterprises.
Most of this literature addressed incentives where
potential externalities could be internalized (Moen
2005), while some have examined circumstances
under which employees take advantage of intellec-
tual human capital (LE) through start-ups (Bhide
7 Knowledge spillovers operate more strongly in some parts of
the economy than in others. Particular characteristics tend to be
associated with locations with high density of opportunities,
such as those hosting high-tech industries. Most innovations
occur in high-technology opportunity industries and not low-
technology opportunity industries (Scherer 1965). The extent
to which the results of innovation can be appropriated by
incumbent firms also varies among industries.
8 Such intellectual human capital is human capital that is
neither publicly available nor perfectly protected. This distin-
guishes it from ordinary human capital that is widely diffused
knowledge and can be acquired at a cost and earns a normal
rate of return (Zucker et al. 1998). This distinction between
intellectual human capital and ordinary human capital is almost
identical to the distinction between rival and non-rival
knowledge found in Romer (1990) where rival, excludable
knowledge elements are primarily the personalized (tacit)
knowledge of individual agents. We assume that the firm owns
the intellectual property that results in a start-up.
18 Z. J. Acs et al.
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1994). If an innovation makes the incumbent firm a
true monopolist, it will not be profitable for the
agent to pursue a start-up, since the sum of rents in
a duopolistic market will be less than monopoly
rent. This paper does not model the incentive
structure under which individual agents become
mobile. Instead, it focuses on institutions that
prevent the creation of a monopoly in the first
place.
3 Theoretical framework
To model entry, we partly draw on previous contri-
butions in the endogenous growth literature. In
particular, those models introduce a mechanism that
fosters innovative entry through investments in R&D.
We will retain that channel of entry, but also
demonstrate how knowledge investment by incum-
bents can spur entry by entrepreneurs that do not
engage in R&D themselves. Since our emphasis is on
entry and not growth per se, our aim is not to derive a
full-fledged growth model, but rather to focus on the
mechanism for entry.9
Consider an economy with demand, supply and a
financial market.10 There are two types of firms:
Incumbents undertaking R&D to improve existing
products and start-ups exploiting knowledge spill-
overs and the existing stock of knowledge to innovate
new products. Firms that develop an improved or new
variety demanded by consumers are rewarded by
temporary monopoly profits until new products out
compete old ones.
3.1 Demand side
Starting with the demand side, consumers maximize




eqt ln hðxÞ½ dt; ð1Þ
where qt [ 0 equals consumer rate of time preference
(discount rate) and h is the sub-utility function.
Assume that different varieties of the x-goods are
perfect substitutes and that mIrefers to the most recent
innovated product or variety, with improved quality
or novel features. If mpt \ pt-1, then all consumers
will prefer the new product,
h xo; x1; x2. . .. . .ð Þ ¼
X1
I¼0
m IxI ; m[ 1: ð2Þ
The novel products/qualities demanded by con-
sumers may range from research-intensive varieties
to products characterized by combining existing
knowledge. Hence, high R&D intensity by itself
does not guarantee successful introduction of a new
product.
3.2 Supply side
On the production side, new products/qualities can
be invented either by incumbent firms investing in
R&D or by entrepreneurial start-ups.11 Successful
entry means a temporary monopoly, where the price
of the new product/quality equals the improved
property of the product, m = pI. The only factor of
production is labor, which is allocated among three
different activities: R&D production (LR), self-
employment through start-ups (LE) or a residual
sector employing R&D findings and producing final
goods (LF),
LR þ LE þ LF ¼ L: ð3Þ
Perfect mobility across sectors assures that wages
are equalized.12 Initial profit conditions for firms/
products that successfully enter the market are
p ¼ ðpI  1ÞY=pI ¼ ðm  1ÞY=m ð4Þ
where pI represents the price of the new good,
corresponding to the quality improvement (m), and
wage is set equal to one. Total consumption expen-
diture is captured by Y, that is, demand for a new
variety. In the long run, free entry implies zero
profits. Hence, in the period preceding the introduc-
tion of a new product/firm, prices equal wage costs,
9 See Braunerhjelm et al. (2006) for a growth model.
10 For details, see Intriligator (1971), Aghion and Howitt
(1992) and Dinopoulos (1996).
11 The general production function is x = ALc, 0 \ c B 1.
12 The final good sector is not modeled in order to enhance
transparency. It can be viewed as a sector with constant returns
to scale, where labor embodied with findings in the R&D sector
at each given time ‘‘t’’ is employed (i.e., labor does not possess
skills related to ongoing R&D).
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which are set to one. The first-order condition implies
m = pI C 1.
The introduction of new product innovations
occurs either through R&D outlays by incumbents
or through start-ups where existing knowledge is
combined in innovative ways. The latter does not
require any investment in R&D.13 Instead, individu-
als combine their given entrepreneurial ability (ej)
with the overall knowledge stock (K) in an economy
to discover commercial opportunities. The societal
knowledge stock is a composite of previous knowl-
edge stemming from activities by incumbents and
start-ups, i.e., knowledge refers not only to scientific
discoveries, but also to novel ways of production and
distribution in traditional businesses, changing busi-
ness models, new marketing strategies, etc. Both
types of entry are assumed to occur through a Poisson
process.
Hence, the first type of product improvement is
related to R&D expenditures, i.e., it is a flow variable,
taking previous scientific knowledge as the departure
point. The second type of innovative new product
draws instead on the overall stock of knowledge and
applies it in a novel way. All innovation implies that
some fixed costs are incurred, such as for R&D or
marketing. Innovation is thus modeled consistently
with real world behavior.
Starting with incumbents, the aggregate probability
of a successful product improvement increases in
an economy’s R&D outlays, measured as R&D
employees.14 As shown above, labor is the only input.
The production technology is characterized by decreas-
ing returns to scale (0 \ c\ 1). At the firm level, each
firm i’s probability (l) of successfully launching a new
product increases with higher R&D investments. Thus,









dt  ð1=rÞLcRdt ð5Þ
where dt denotes an infinite increment of time and
(r)refers to an efficiency parameter that reflects how
smoothly a new discovery is introduced to the
market. The second type of innovative new product
occurs through start-ups, where the probability of a
successful start-up (g) is related to the given knowl-
edge stock K (at each point in time) times the average






Kdt ¼ g ðe^KÞdt  ð1=rÞKcdt: ð6Þ
At the individual level, the probability of success
depends on each individual j’s given endowment of
entrepreneurial talent, which is unevenly distributed
across the population of L individuals in an economy
(Lucas 1978).15 Also here, decreasing returns to scale
(0 \ c\ 1) prevail since an increase in entrepre-
neurial ability will not translate into a proportional
increase in start-ups.16
The total rate of innovative entry in an economy
can be calculated by employing the additive property
of Poisson distributions,
j dt ¼ l dt þ g dt ¼ ð1=rÞðKc þ LcRÞdt: ð7Þ
13 To some extent, this parallels the classification of horizontal
and vertical innovations (Howitt 1999; Gancia and Zilibotti
2005). The former refers to new products, whereas the latter
implies quality improvements in existing products. In the
model specification used by Howitt (1999), an increase in R&D
directed towards horizontal innovations may decrease the profit
flow accruing to vertical R&D, thereby undermining incentives
to undertake vertical innovations. This impairs growth. How-
ever, there are considerable differences between the models.
The previous literature refers to the discussion on ‘‘scale
effect’’ and growth, initiated by Jones (1995). Moreover, in
Howitt’s model, different production technologies but identical
inputs (R&D staff) are assumed for the two types of
innovation, whereas in the present context, identical technol-
ogies are assumed, but different factors of production are
employed. Finally, the line between an improved quality of an
existing variety or a new product that replaces the former
product is thin and not necessary for our argument.
14 The assumed Poisson entry process means that the time
frequency with which entry will occur is a random variable
whose distribution is exponential with parameter l, i.e., l is the
probability per unit of time.
15 We follow Lucas (1978), who assumes that managerial
talent is distinct from labor talent. Lazear (2005) assumes that
workers and managers have the same two skills in different
combinations. Those with more balanced skills are more likely
to become entrepreneurs. Those with varied work and educa-
tional backgrounds are much more likely to start their own
businesses than those who have focused on one role at work or
concentrated in one subject at school. The implications for the
size distribution of firms are similar in both models.
16 Moreover, it would not be optimal for all economic
activities to be undertaken by entrepreneurs.
20 Z. J. Acs et al.
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Hence, incumbents may now be replaced by rival
firms in an R&D race or by start-ups.17
3.3 The financial market
To cover investment costs in R&D or other costs,
such as marketing, both incumbents and Schumpete-
rian entrepreneurs must turn to the financial market.18
Investors take a risk since start-ups may replace
firms, or entrepreneurs may fail. Start-ups are
included in investor portfolios prior to entering the
market.
Assume that investors can buy shares in all firms
in order to minimize risk, implying an average return
of r(t). Investors calculate expected returns on their
investments over time in the following way. First, a
firm’s instantaneous profits (p = (pI - 1)(Y/pI)) and
the discounted return (V)—or the value of the firm—
are linked through the financial market. The
(expected) discounted profit is simply the value of
the firm at a given time, times the probability it will
succeed in inventing (lj) or innovating (gj) new
varieties, minus incurred labor costs.
In each period of time (dt) the shareholder receives
a dividend, which is related to profits, and the firm
appreciates in value V

(t)dt = (dV/dt)dt. However,
incumbents (whether R&D-based or the entrepre-
neurial type) run the risk of being replaced by the
introduction of new qualities (j), thereby risking a
loss of V(t),
pðtÞ=VðtÞ½ dt þ V ðtÞ=VðtÞ 1  j½ dt
þ ðV ðtÞ  VðtÞÞ=VðtÞ
h i
jdt ¼ rðtÞdt ð8Þ
where (1 – j) is the probability that the firm survives
and j represents the probability that the firm will be
forced out of business. Consequently, investors will
incur losses on previous investments. From Eq. 8, as
dt goes to zero,
V
 ðtÞ=VðtÞ þ p=VðtÞ ¼ rðtÞ þ j; V ðtÞ ¼ 0 ð9Þ
p=VðtÞ ¼ rðtÞ þ j  ~r ð10Þ
i.e., the higher risks associated with an investment in
incumbents (because they may become replaced and
a capital loss may be incurred) require a higher return
in steady state.
To close the model intertemporal consumption
must match intertemporal production—i.e., entry of
new goods and start-ups reliant upon access to
capital. Such an exercise implies solving a dynamic
consumption (growth) model subject to a budget
constraint (returns on savings and wages). This will
not be undertaken here since our predominant interest
is entry, not growth. However, in equilibrium the
standard dynamic equilibrium condition will apply,
implying that the consumer rate of time-preferences
(q) must equal the rate of return (~r) of investments
over time. Then capital flows to the financial market
(savings that is invested in new ventures) correspond
exactly to demand for new products of intertempo-
rally utility-maximizing consumers. Note that this
does not imply a continuous flow of innovation for
each period of time.
Embarking from a traditional consumer utility
function, where utility is increasing in new and high
quality goods, it was shown how either incumbents
or start-ups supply such goods. The production
technology only requires labor. Incumbents will
employ labor in R&D, whereas new entrepreneurs
will engage in production by drawing upon the
existing stock of knowledge. Both types of firms
depend on capital injections to finance innovation.
This is supplied by the financial market through
savings by households. Since firms may be threa-
tened by innovation, investors require a risk-
adjusted rate of return to invest in either incumbents
or start-ups. Equilibrium in the labor market is
assured by the assumption of free mobility across
sectors, while free entry in the long-run drives
profits to zero.
4 Empirical analysis
According to this model, expected profits from
entrepreneurship are enhanced by the magnitude of
new knowledge, but constrained by the commercial-
ization capabilities of incumbent firms.
17 The same factors that are identified by the theory developed
here, as influencing entrepreneurship is also likely to influence
imitation in the same direction. This paper does not explore the
implications of replictive entrepreneurship.
18 To improve tractability, we do not consider self-financing as
a viable possibility. This connects with Schumpeter (1911
[1934]), who was adamant that the entrepreneur is not a risk-
bearer. Risk bearing is the function of the capitalist who lends
his funds to the entrepreneur.
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4.1 The hypotheses
Given that entrepreneurial activity exceeds zero, the
following testable hypotheses are derived from our
model (see Appendix A):
Hypothesis 1 An increase in the stock of knowl-
edge is expected to positively impact the degree of
entrepreneurship.
Hypothesis 2 The more efficient incumbents are at
exploiting R&D, the smaller the effect of a given
knowledge stock on entrepreneurship.19
Hypothesis 3 Entrepreneurial activities can be
expected to decrease under higher regulations, admin-
istrative barriers and governmental intervention in the
market.
Our model explains entrepreneurship as a function
of the following factors: knowledge stock (KSTOCK),
R&D exploitation by incumbents (INC) and barriers to
entrepreneurship captured by r (BARR). It considers
factors such as risk aversion, legal restrictions, bureau-
cratic constraints, labor market rigidities, taxes, lack of
social acceptance, etc. (Parker 2004). The existence of
such barriers is reflected by a low value of r. This
explains why economic agents might decide against
starting up, even when in possession of knowledge that
promises potential profit opportunity. In addition,
culture, traditions and institutions are more difficult
factors to identify than strictly economic factors, but
they also play an important role in entrepreneurship. To
capture such country-specific differences, we estimate
a reduced form equation with a fixed-effect panel
regression technique,20
ENTj;t ¼ kj þ aKSTOCKj;t þ BARR0j;tb þ INC
0
j;tc
þ a4Z 0j;td þ ej;t
where j denotes country, t represents time and Z is a
vector of control variables. The error term is expected
to exhibit standard properties: That is, ej,t is assumed
to have an independent and identical distribution with
a zero mean and variance r2 for all j and t.
4.2 The variables
The dependent variable, entrepreneurship (ENT),
proxies country share of self-employed as a percentage
of the labor force.21 There are several reasons to expect
the self-employment rate to decrease as economies
become more developed. Blau (1987) argues this is a
fundamental economic change. He shows that the time
series of self-employment is correlated with a measure
of the extent to which technological change has been
biased towards industries in which self-employment is
important. Acs et al. (1994a) document the diversity in
self-employment across countries and in time-series
by examining variations in self-employment rates
across OECD countries. However, the convergence of
several factors, notably the decline in heavy manufac-
turing, growth of services and possibly the bias
towards technological change in the 1990s tended to
stem the decline in self-employment for most OECD
countries. The self-employment rate is the best
available measure across-countries and over time,
and it serves as an acceptable proxy for high-impact
entrepreneurship.22
With respect to explanatory variables, our main
focus is the endowment of knowledge within an
economy. We first elaborate a stock measure com-
posed of accumulated annual R&D flows, assuming an
annual depreciation rate of ten percent (KSTOCK).
For the time period we are investigating (1981–2002),
this implies a rapid accumulation of knowledge stock
in the first 10 years (up to 1991) followed by more
stable development where change in the knowledge
stock is determined by annual outlays on R&D.
Obviously, this can insert biases into the estimations.
We have therefore chosen to approximate knowledge
stocks over the entire period with annual R&D flows,
19 The efficiency with which incumbents exploit knowledge is,
in part, related to the incentive structure and intellectual property
rights of the firm (Moen 2005; Hellmann 2007; Hvide 2006).
20 The choice of empirical model is based on an F-test to check
the validity of using a fixed-effect regression technique as
compared to OLS. The test clearly rejects the null hypotheses of
all fixed effects jointly being zero. We also estimated the model
without fixed effects, which yields unstable results. A dynamic
panel estimation is also a possible approach, but is more
appropriate for limited time series data with many panels. The
current paper has rather long time series with few panels.
21 The agricultural sector has been excluded.
22 Start-up data are available from the World Bank, but for a
different set of countries across a considerably shorter period
(1997–2004). See Klapper et al. (2007) for more. The data are
shown to be positively (but weakly) correlated with the self-
employment data used in the current study.
22 Z. J. Acs et al.
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which actually constitutes variation in the stock
variable once the stock has been built up. Considering
that the correlation between the knowledge stock
variable and R&D flows was very strong, annual R&D
outlays are an acceptable approximation for knowl-
edge stocks.23 In line with our model, we expect an
increase in relative knowledge endowment to increase
the profitability of entrepreneurial activity by facili-
tating the recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities.
The knowledge variable is normalized by GDP.
The most difficult variable to model empirically is
incumbent intra-temporal exploitation of knowledge.
We use two variables that are important indicators of
the extent to which incumbents draw upon knowledge
flows. The first is the number of patents (PATENTS)
in relation to population, where a higher proportion
implies that incumbents use more of the existing
knowledge flows (Griliches 1986).24 The second
approximation is the gap between actual and potential
GDP (GAP). The argument is that full employment of
the economy resources, a small percentage difference
between actual and potential GDP, diminishes
possibilities for start-ups through exploitation of
knowledge flows. Both variables are assumed to
influence entrepreneurship negatively.
We use two variables to capture the extent of
barriers to entrepreneurship in an economy. First, we
incorporate public expenditure in relation to GDP
(GEXP) as an approximation of total tax pressure and
the extent of regulatory interventions in the economy
(Nicoletti et al. 2000). As an alternative, we also
include tax share in GDP for both individual (TAX-
PERS) and corporate firms (TAXCORP). Start-ups are
less likely to occur if incentive structures are distorted
through high taxes (Henrekson 2005). We expect
these variables to be negatively associated with
entrepreneurship.25
In addition to the above variables, we also include a
number of control variables where previous research
indicates influence on entrepreneurship. Numerous
studies claim urban environments are particularly
conducive to entrepreneurial activities, innovation and
growth because of agglomeration economies (Jacobs
1969; Krugman 1991). Information flows are denser in
cities, where different competencies and financial
resources are more accessible, and market proximity is
obvious (Acs et al. 1994b). We therefore include a
variable to capture the share of the population living in
urban areas (URBAN). We expect greater urbaniza-
tion to be reflected in higher entrepreneurial activities.
Studies on demographic variables conclude that indi-
viduals in the age cohort 30–44 are most likely to
undertake entrepreneurial activities. A large share of
population in this cohort (AGE) is expected to relate
positively to the share of entrepreneurs. In order to
smooth out business fluctuations, we control for
economic growth, defined as a 5-year moving average
(GROWTH). Finally, we control for time-specific
effects by implementing either period dummies,
annual dummies or a time trend.26
All regressions are based on data for 19 OECD
countries for the period 1981 to 2002. Data come
predominantly from the OECD, but other sources are
also used (see Appendix B).27 Summary statistics and
correlations are listed in Tables 1 and 2, respectively.
5 Regression results
Regression results estimating the entrepreneurship rate
(ENT) for 1981–2002 are presented in Tables 3 and 4.
These results are consistent with the predictions of our
model. Entrepreneurial opportunities do not appear to
be exogenous but rather systematically created by a
high presence of knowledge spillovers. As the positive
and statistically significant coefficients of the knowl-
edge stock suggest, entrepreneurial activity tends to be
greater where knowledge is more prevalent.
23 For the full sample the correlation coefficient between
knowledge stocks and R&D flows varied between 0.95 and
0.98 (5-year averages), depending on the lag-structure. There
are some variations across countries. R&D data are not
available prior to 1981; hence, it was not possible to construct
knowledge stocks using data from the 1970s.
24 Giuri et al. (2007) and Braunerhjelm and Svensson (2008)
provide evidence that large companies hold the dominating
part of patents.
25 We could also use the World Bank cost of doing business as
an alternative measure barrier to entry.
26 For instance, Jorgenson (2001) argues that increased
technological change enhanced entrepreneurial activity, par-
ticularly in the 1990s.
27 The following countries are included: Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ire-
land, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK and US. For some variables
with missing values, we have used the closest year available.
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Table 3 reports results where no lags are imple-
mented on the knowledge stock variable. In the first
three regressions, variables are defined as 5-year
averages, while the remaining three implement
annual data.28 Different versions of the time variables
are used in the estimations, albeit the results are quite
robust regardless of variable specification. When data
are defined as 5-year averages in the estimations, the
knowledge stock is shown to be positive in all
regressions and significant in two of three. With
respect to the remaining variables, only demographic
structure (AGE) has a consistent and significant
impact on entrepreneurship. Incumbent exploitation
of knowledge (PATENT and GAP) and barriers to
entrepreneurship (GEXP and taxes) have the
expected negative signs but are insignificant. Only
personal income taxes have a weak negative and
significant impact on entrepreneurship.
One reason for the relatively low explanatory value
of these regressions may be the limited number of
observations from using 5-year averages for the
estimations. When the regressions are repeated using
annual data, the significance of the knowledge stock
variable is strengthened considerably. This is also the
case for variables representing entrepreneurial barriers
and the impact of incumbents. Note that the patent
variable is significant in all regressions, suggesting
that extensive knowledge exploitation by incumbents
is negatively related to entrepreneurial activity. The
lower the ability of incumbents to appropriate new
knowledge, the more knowledge will spill over to third
parties, as predicted by the theory. Hence, to the degree
that incumbent firms take advantage of opportunities,
there will be less entrepreneurial activity. The GAP
variable, admittedly defined at an aggregate level,
fares less well. Public expenditure (GEXP), which
indicates a wide set of barriers to entrepreneurship, has
a negative and significant effect on entrepreneurship.
As we substitute government expenditure for the two
tax variables, the negative and statistically significant
coefficient of the personal tax rate indicates that
personal taxes are a barrier to entrepreneurship. The
positive and weak significance of the corporate tax rate
may actually indicate that a higher rate of corporate
taxes reduces the propensity for incumbent firms to
appropriate returns from opportunities. This can
generate more entrepreneurial opportunities.
A lag structure ranging from 1 to 3 years is imposed
on the knowledge stock variable, as shown in Table 4.
One regression is shown with variables defined as 5-
year averages; remaining regressions use annual data.
We only present results for estimations using annual
dummies.29 In general, the estimations conform with
the results in Table 3, particularly for variables related
to knowledge stock, barriers to entrepreneurship and
incumbents exploitation of knowledge. The patent
variable always presents a negative sign (as does the
GAP variable with one exception), and is significant in
four of the five regressions using annual data.
Table 2 reports a relatively high correlation
coefficient (.74) between the knowledge stock
variable (KSTOCK) and the patent variable (PAT-
ENT). A similar but weaker coefficient (.47) is
Table 1 Descriptive
statistics
Variable Minimum Mean Maximum SD Observations
ENT 2.83 4.90 8.41 1.37 418
KSTOCK .28 1.77 4.63 .75 411
GEXP 30.2 47.87 72.93 8.43 412
TAXPERS 3.83 11.54 26.22 4.74 410
TAXCORP .27 2.87 8.92 1.31 410
PATENT 9.8E-4 .28 1.38 .26 414
GAP -10.90 -.65 6.83 2.65 418
GROWTH -3.02 2.64 9.77 1.51 418
URBAN 43.3 74.13 97.10 11.66 418
AGE 16.87 21.88 25.60 1.72 418
28 Averages are calculated for the periods 1981–85, 1986–90,
1991–95 and 1996–2002. The average for the last period is
based on 7 years.
29 Independent of the time variable used (trend, period dummy
or year dummy), the results are quite robust. Regression results
using alternative time specifications are available from the
authors on request.
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Table 2 Correlation matrix, independent variables, 5-year averages, period dummies
KSTOCK KSTOCK-1 GEXP TAX-PERS TAX-CORP PATENT GAP GROWTH URBAN AGE
KSTOCK 1
KSTOCK-1 .95 1
GEXP .11 .02 1
TAXPERS .15 .02 .45 1
TAXCORP .09 .10 -.44 -.17 1
PATENT .74 .76 .35 .05 -.19 1
GAP -.04 -.00 -.26 .00 .20 .02 1
GROWTH -.20 -.22 -.46 -.16 .29 -.32 .47 1
URBAN .19 .24 .11 .44 -.00 .08 .02 -.18 1
AGE .09 .11 -.06 .14 .01 .04 -.01 -.16 .19 1
Note: Period dummies not shown. The correlation matrix for annual data is highly similar and is not shown, but of course available on
request
Table 3 Regression results, country fixed-effect panels, 5-year averages and annual data














































































































R2 .64 .63 .64 .60 .63 .61
F 8.04 9.88 8.64 71.87 22.13 19.15
No. of obs. 73 73 72 408 408 403
a Growth is defined as a 5-year moving average when annual data are implemented
b Linear time trend
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obtained for the variables GROWTH and GAP, i.e.,
the difference between potential and actual GDP.
Finally, the variables GROWTH and governmental
expenditure (GEXP) display a similar degree of
correlation (.46). This may introduce multicollinear-
ity into the regressions, making the estimators less
efficient, albeit still unbiased. We therefore rerun the
regressions where we have excluded GAP (all
regressions) and control for the impact of the
exclusion in the regressions of either PATENT or
GEXP on the other estimates.
As shown in Tables 5 and 6, removing the patent
variable from the regressions does not influence the
estimates of the knowledge stock variable. However,
when we omit GEXP the control variable GROWTH
turns significantly positive, but the remaining vari-
ables are basically unaffected (if the growth variable
is omitted, the significance of the GEXP variable is
strengthened). Hence, these correlations have only a
minor influence on the results.
Thus, the empirical findings that entrepreneurship
tends to be systematically greater in the presence of
Table 4 Regression results, country fixed-effect panels, 5-year averages (first column) and annual data, lagged knowledge stock
variable





– – – –


























































































– – – – –













R2 .60 .61 .62 .60 .60 .59
F 5.28 18.88 20.82 17.80 18.74 16.44
No. of obs. 55 385 372 367 353 349
a Growth is defined as a 5-year moving average when annual data are implemented
b Linear time trend
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Table 5 Regression results, country fixed-effect panels, 5-year averages and annual data





















































































R2 .64 .65 .63 .60 .61 .60
F 17.88 15.17 11.52 117.53 100.57 182.17
No. of obs. 74 74 73 411 411 408
a Growth is defined as a 5-year moving average when annual data are implemented
b Linear time trend
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knowledge spillovers are strikingly robust. Although
the significance and even sign of some control
variables are more sensitive to time period and variable
specification, entrepreneurial activity responds posi-
tively to economic knowledge, regardless of time and
variable specification.
6 Conclusions
This paper has developed a Knowledge Spillover
Theory of Entrepreneurship in which the creation of
new knowledge expands the set of technological
opportunity. Therefore, entrepreneurial activity does
not involve simply the arbitrage of opportunities, but
also the exploitation of intra-temporal knowledge
spillovers not appropriated by incumbent firms. The
theory focuses on individual agents with endowments of
new economic knowledge as the unit of analysis in a
model of economic growth, rather than exogenously
assumed firms. Agents with new knowledge endoge-
nously pursue the exploitation of knowledge. This
suggests that knowledge spillovers come from the stock
of knowledge, and there is a strong relationship between
such spillovers and entrepreneurial activity. If incum-
bent firms appropriated all the rents of R&D, there
would be no intra-temporal knowledge spillovers.
There are several implications of these findings for
future research. First, theories of entrepreneurship
need to explain where opportunities come from, how
intra-temporal knowledge spillovers occur, and the
dynamics of occupational choice leading to new firm
formation. Prevailing theories of entrepreneurship do
not address these questions. Second, the theory helps
better understand the contradictions in Smith’s
Wealth of Nations between increasing returns (the
pin factory) and how the market economy can harness
self-interest to the common good, leading individuals
to unintentional ends (the invisible hand). The real
challenge in endogenous growth theory is not that the
firm will under-invest in new knowledge, but how to
balance increasing returns with competition. The
theory provides an explanation of the role of the
individual and the firm in the economy. If Romer
inspired a new economics of knowledge, The
Knowledge Spillover Theory of Entrepreneurship
brings us a step closer to understanding the essential
role of the entrepreneur in the market economy.
Finally, the role of intellectual property rights
protection needs to be revaluated in light of the
theory. If intellectual property protection becomes
too strong, and all rents accrue to the producer of
knowledge, it will reduce intra-temporal knowledge
spillovers, and ultimately innovation and growth (Acs
and Sanders 2008).
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Appendix A
From Eqs. 5, 6 and 7, the impact of a change in the
knowledge stock (K), R&D efforts by incumbents
(LR) and in the efficiency parameter (r, 0 \ r\ 1),
where values close to zero in the efficiency variable
implies fewer obstacles in introducing new products,















R2 .60 .61 .60 .60 .58 .58
F 11.73 78.80 102.43 73.52 91.17 64.60
No. of obs. 392 390 373 372 354 353
a Growth is defined as a 5-year moving average when annual data are implemented
b Linear time trend
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jK ¼ ð1=rÞcKc1 [ 0;
jKK ¼ ð1=rÞðc  1ÞcKc2\0 ðc\1Þ; ðA.1aÞ
jLR ¼ ð1=rÞcLc1R [ 0;
jLRLR ¼ ð1=rÞðc  1ÞcLc2R \0 ðc\1Þ ðA.1bÞ
jr ¼  ðKcÞ þ ðLÞc½ =r2\0;
jrr ¼ 2 ðKcÞ þ ðLÞc½ =r3 [ 0; ðA.1cÞ
implying that the probability of entrepreneurial start-
ups is increasing in the knowledge stock (weighted
by average entrepreneurial ability), but at a decreas-
ing rate (A.1a). By increasing R&D staff, incumbent
firms increase the probability of launching a new
quality, albeit at a decreasing rate (A.1b). Both
types of innovation are positively affected by a
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